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The Child Labor Deterrence Act: American
Unilateralism and the GATT
James P. Kelleher
Child laborers are the most exploitable of all workers. They
are easily intimidated, often have few legal rights, and work for
very low wages.1 A recent Washington Post article described
Praiwan, a thirteen year old Bangkok boy who makes leather
bags from eight in the morning until eleven at night.2 He has
only one hour off for lunch and another hour for dinner, and just
one day off every two weeks. He earns $24 a month. In India, a
non-governmental organization filed a writ petition to the
Supreme Court on behalf of thirty-two children between the
ages of six and fourteen.3 The children had been kidnapped to
work in the carpet industry. The petition stated that the chil-
dren had been treated brutally for even minor mistakes: hung
upside down from trees, beaten with bamboo sticks, and
branded with red hot iron rods.4 In 1991, the International La-
bour Organization (ILO) estimated that half of the 50,000 chil-
dren working as bonded labor in Pakistan's carpet-weaving
industry would never reach the age of twelve - victims of dis-
ease and malnutrition.5
Unfortunately, the exploitation of child workers is not an
isolated problem. According to Michel Hansenne, the ILO Direc-
tor General, the total number of working children is certainly in
1. See WiLLIM J. KNIGHT, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR
AFFAIRS, THE WoRLD's EXPLOITED CmLDREN: GROWING UP SADLY (1980). See
also Patricia Hyndman, The Exploitation of Child Workers in South and South
East Asia, 58 NORD. J. INTVL L. 94 (1989).
2. Lynne Kamm, How Our Greed Keeps Kids Trapped in Foreign Sweat-
shops, WASH. PosT, Mar. 28, 1993, at C5.
3. See Hyndman, supra note 1, at 97 n.24 (citing K. Satyarthi, Child
Workers in the Carpet Industry of the Mirzapauric Bhadohi Belt: An Activist's
Viewpoint, n.16 (1988)) (paper prepared for a Lahore seminar).
4. Id.
5. Cited by Senator Harkin in his speech introducing the Child Labor De-
terrence Act of 1993. 139 CONG. REC. S3179 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993) (state-
ment of Sen. Harkin).
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the hundreds of millions.6 Hansenne noted that although the
conditions under which children work have worsened in recent
years and the number of child workers has increased in many
countries, few countries have developed comprehensive plans to
deal with the problem.7 A bill now before the U.S. Senate, the
Child Labor Deterrence Act,s attempts to address the problem of
international child labor by prohibiting the import of articles
produced by child workers into the United States.9 The Bill is
an extension of recent unilateral attempts by the United States
to regulate economic activities overseas through the threat of
trade restrictions.' 0
This Note analyzes the Child Labor Deterrence Act in light
of U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)," and in reference to policy considerations re-
garding child labor programs. Part I outlines existing American
legislation which purports to restrict international child labor
and discusses the trend towards stronger unilateral measures.
Part II describes the proposed Child Labor Deterrence Act. Part
III examines relevant American obligations under GATT and
concludes that the Child Labor Deterrence Act would violate
those obligations by unilaterally dictating the labor standards
that other nations must follow. Part IV explores the rationale
behind the GATT policy of limiting a nation's jurisdictional
reach to purely domestic concerns, and examines the Child La-
bor Deterrence Act in light of that policy. Finally, the Note con-
cludes that, although unilateral action may be warranted in
some instances, multilateral agreements which build on local in-
6. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL
CHILD LABOR PROBLEMS, 93-6 FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS 3 (1993) (press release
from the ILO Washington Office on July 21, 1992).
7. Id. ILAB selected child labor for inclusion in its 1992 report "because
child labor has been a dramatically worsening global problem." Id. at 2. The
monograph provides information on 170 countries and lists some specific esti-
mates for the number of children working in several developing countries: 4.8
million in Nepal, 3 million in Bangladesh, 12 million in Nigeria, 7 million in
Brazil, and 800,000 in Columbia. Id. The 1991 State Department human
rights report on child labor showed 56 significant changes from the 1990 report.
Id. Thirty-five of these changes were negative. Id.
8. S. 613, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
9. See infra dotes 50-71 and accompanying text.
10. See generally AGGRESSIVE UNmLATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POL-
Icy AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick
eds., 1990).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
GATT is a U.S. executive agreement treated as a treaty obligation. See JOHN H.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF THE GATT 37 (1969).
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formation and effectively balance the various needs of child
workers are the preferable means of dealing with the exploita-
tion of child labor.
I. EXISTING AMERICAN LEGISLATION
International child labor and U.S. trade policy are linked in
five pieces of existing federal legislation: the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP), 12 the Caribbean Basin Economic Re-
covery Act (CBERA),13 the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC),14 the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA), 15 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 197416 as
amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
(OTCA). 17 These can be broken down into two categories. The
first is composed of GSP, CBERA, OPIC, and MIGA which pro-
vide special trade benefits to developing countries. In contrast,
section 301 authorizes the President to enforce U.S. trade rights
through retaliation against states that have violated those
rights. 18
The GSP and CBERA allow the President to grant duty-free
treatment to certain articles imported from beneficiary develop-
ing countries. 19 OPIC provides political risk insurance and pro-
12. The Generalized System of Preferences is part of the Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V., §§ 501-505, 88 Stat. 2066 (1975) (codified as
amended in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1988)) [hereinafter GSPI.
13. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. II, sub-
tit. A, §§ 201-18, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
06 (1988)) [hereinafter CBERA].
14. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195. pt. I, ch. 2, tit. IV.,§ 231, as added Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, pt. I, § 105, 83 Stat. 809
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988)) [hereinafter OPIC].
15. MIGA Enabling Statute, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 101(e) [tit. I], 101 Stat.
1329-131, 1329-134 (1987) (codified as amended in 22 U.S.C. § 290k (1988)).
16. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. IH, ch. 1, § 301, 88 Stat.
1978, 2041 (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. 2411 (1988)). Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 addresses foreign restrictions on U.S. trade. The Act has
been amended repeatedly, most notably in 1984 and 1988. See generally AG-
GRESSIVE UmLATERALsM, supra note 10.
17. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, tit. I, subtit. C, pt. 1, § 1301(a), 102 Stat. 1164 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(1988)) [hereinafter OTCA]. See generally Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor
Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the International
Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1990). The Act calls for domestic policy
reforms providing for new investments and incentive structures and sends a
strong message to trading partners that "the United States will not watch idly
as myriad unfair trade practices erode the United States' position in the global
economy." Id. at 84.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
19. 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988), 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988), respectively.
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ject finance to assist private investment by U.S. businesses. 20
MIGA is a World Bank institution - in which the United States
participates - that promotes capital flows to developing coun-
tries by offering guarantees against non-commercial risks.21
The GSP, CBERA, and OPIC condition the benefits of U.S. par-
ticipation upon a beneficiary country's respect for certain "inter-
nationally recognized worker rights," including a minimum age
for the employment of children. 22 The implementing legislation
for MIGA made U.S. participation conditional upon MIGA's U.S.
director taking steps to obtain the adoption of certain policies. 23
One such step was to propose and actively seek to ensure that
MIGA would not guarantee investments "in any country which
has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally rec-
ognized worker rights to workers in that country."24
Although there was originally some variation among the la-
bor rights provisions of the acts, by 1990 the standards and pro-
visions concerning worker rights (including child labor) in
CBERA, OPIC, and MIGA were identical to those of the GSP.28
Of the four, the GSP legislation has had the greatest impact and
has stirred up the most political controversy.26
Under the GSP, the President may provide duty-free treat-
ment for any eligible article from any beneficiary developing
20. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
21. FAYE LYLE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu OF LABOR AFFAms, WoRKER
RIGHTS IN U.S. POUCY 11 (1991).
22. The specific provisions are: GSP, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(bX7) (1988);
CBERA, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (Supp. II 1990); and OPIC, 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)
(1988)). Under each of the above provisions, the term "internationally recog-
nized worker rights" includes: (1) the right of association; (2) the right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively; (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor; (4) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (5)
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work,
and occupational safety and health. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(aX4) (1988). Note that
the statutes do not specify under (4) what the minimum age for employment
should be, only that there should be one.
23. LYLE, supra note 21, at 11.
24. 22 U.S.C. § 290k-2 (1988). For the U.S. definition of "internationally
recognized worker rights," see supra note 22.
25. See supra note 22. In the original CBERA passed in 1983, the worker
rights provisions were discretionary. LYLE, supra note 21, at 8. The Customs
and Trade Act of 1990 made worker rights criteria a mandatory element of the
designation process, as they had become for the GSP in 1984. P.L. 101-382, tit.
II, subtit. B, pt. 1, § 213, 104 Stat. 656 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(7) (Supp. II, 1990)). The relevant OPIC provisions became synony-
mous with those in the GSP in 1985. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Amendments Act of 1985, P.L. 99-204, § 5, 99 Stat. 1670 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a) (1988)).
26. See LYLE, supra note 21, at 14.
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country. 27 The Act, nonetheless, places a number of restrictions
on the President's power to designate a developing nation as a
GSP beneficiary. 28 One of these restrictions provides that the
President shall not designate any country a beneficiary country
if the country has not taken or is not taking steps to afford inter-
nationally recognized worker rights to workers in that coun-
try.2 9 Under the GSP, "internationally recognized worker
rights" include five types of legal protection, one of which is a
minimum age for the employment of children.30 To enforce
these provisions, the GSP Subcommittee of the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) conducts investiga-
tions concerning the practice of individual countries.8 1 The
USTR initiates investigations in response to petitions from in-
terested parties in the United States which allege worker rights
violations in one of the beneficiary countries.32
Although on the surface GSP status is contingent, at least
to some degree, on the prohibition of child labor, in practice, a
developing country's child labor policies are rarely definitive.
Several factors come into play in determining GSP status. First,
the GSP subcommittee of the USTR can use its discretion in de-
termining whether or not to accept a petition calling for a review
of the GSP status of a developing country.3 3 The petition can be
rejected and no review conducted at all.3 4 Second, a minimum
age for employment is only one of the criteria listed under
worker rights. The subcommittee must make an overall judge-
ment of the status of internationally recognized worker rights. 35
If child labor is not given priority over the other four worker
rights criteria, child labor violations may not prove decisive.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2461.
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b).
29. Id. § 2462(bX7).
30. See supra note 22.
31. 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (1993).
32. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0. The regulation defines an interested party as a
party who has a "significant economic interest" in the subject of the request for
review, or any party representing a "significant economic interest that would be
materially affected by the action requested." Id. § 2007.0(d).
33. The subcommittee can determine whether the petition "warrants fur-
ther review." 15 C.F.R. § 2007.2(a)(1). See generally PETER DoRMAN, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, WORKER RIGHTS AND U.S. TRADE
PoLIcy (1989).
34. The subcommittee may decide not to review a GSP beneficiary country
even when worker rights violations in that country are well documented. Such
reviews are potentially high profile activities and may impose significant for-
eign policy costs. DoRMAN, supra note 33, at 5.
35. Id. at 7.
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Third, "a minimum age for the employment of children" is a
rather vague requirement. The legislation does not specify any
particular age.3 6 Fourth, the GSP requires only that beneficiary
countries be "taking steps" to afford these internationally recog-
nized worker rights.3 7 This is a rather nebulous criterion and
certainly open to broad interpretation.38 Finally, the designa-
tion is ultimately left to executive discretion. The subcommittee
makes its recommendation to the President, but the President
makes the final decision whether to remove GSP preference
from a country.3 9
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA)40
amended Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.41 Section 301
requires the USTR, under the direction of the President, to in-
36. See supra note 22.
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(bX7).
38. In order to avoid imposing sanctions, an administration could deem
cosmetic and insignificant policy changes as evidence that the mandated steps
are being taken. Harlan Mandel, Note, In Pursuit of the Missing Link: Interna.
tional Worker Rights and International Trade?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
443, 471 (1989). Some of the USTR's GSP worker rights determinations have
been criticized because of this issue. See, for example, the USTR's 1987 deci-
sion not to revoke South Korea's GSP status. Id. at 471 n.151.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2462.
Paragraph... (7) [the worker rights provision] shall not prevent the
designation of any country as a beneficiary developing country under
this section if the President determines that such designation will be in
the national economic interest of the United States and reports such
determination to the Congress with his reasons therefor.
Id. 15 C.F.R. § 2007.8(bX2Xv) also provides that the President shall consider
"the level of economic development of such country, including the per capita
GNP, the living standards of its inhabitants and any other economic factor the
President deems appropriate" in making his determination. The House Confer-
ence Report stipulates,
It is recognized that acceptable minimum standards may vary from
country to country. However, the Committee does expect the Presi-
dent... to require that any developing country specifically demon-
strate respect for the internationally recognized rights of its workers.
Ways and Means Committee, House Report to Accompany H.R. 6063, H.R. REP.
No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.)
5112. U.S. Courts have held that the President's decision to grant or withhold
GSP benefits is not subject to judicial review. Florshein Shoe v. United States,
744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. See supra note 17.
41. See generally AGGREssrvE UNILATERALISM, supra note 10. Section 301
allows the United States to use the threat of trade retaliation against other
countries to eliminate trade practices that the United States has unilaterally
decided are unacceptable. As such, Section 301 seeks one-way unrequited con-
cessions from other trading partners. Id. One commentator stated, "The new
Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is probably
the most criticized piece of U.S. foreign trade legislation since the Hawley-
Smoot Tariff Act of 1930." Robert E. Hudec, Thinking about the New Section
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vestigate complaints about unfair trade practices of other na-
tions, and authorizes it to take a broad range of retaliatory
actions against measures found to constitute unfair trade prac-
tices. 42 The Act expressly requires the USTR to prosecute cer-
tain unfair practices while leaving the prosecution of other
practices to the agency's discretion.43 One of these discretionary
provisions allows the USTR to include the denial of worker
rights as an unfair trade practice." OTCA defines worker
rights in the same language as the GSP provisions. 45 The inclu-
sion of worker rights as an unfair trade practice is based on the
premise that by violating worker rights which are honored by
U.S. producers, foreign states gain an unfair competitive advan-
tage.46 The OTCA marked the first time that the United States
had conditioned reciprocal trade benefits on the implementation
of internationally recognized worker rights.47 The worker rights
301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIvE UNATERALmSM, supra note 10, at
113.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1988).
43. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a), 2411(b) (1988), respectively.
44. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b)(1), (d)(3)(BXiii) (1988). Some observers caution
that conditioning trade on worker rights may come back to haunt the United
States. The United States does not have the same level of welfare legislation
that some European countries consider to be basic worker rights (e.g., paid ma-
ternity leave or universal health care). These countries could arguably employ
worker rights as a convenient tool to protect themselves against U.S. exports.
See LYLE, supra note 21, at 19.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4). See supra note 22.
46. According to this theory, exploitation through low wages, hazardous
working conditions, and long hours allows producers to keep costs "artificially"
low and thus undercut the prices of U.S. firms. The phenomenon is also re-
ferred to as "social dumping" since the exported products owe their competitive-
ness to low labor standards. See Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of
International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime, 126 INTVL LAB.
REV. 565, 567 (1987). Developing countries have rejected this theory, holding
that it is simply a disguise for protectionism. J.M. Servias, The Social Clause in
Trade Agreements: Wishful Thinking or an Instrument of Social Progress, 128
INV'L LAB. REV. 423, 425 (1989). The ILO Director-General commented on the
phenomenon referring to the economic theory of comparative advantage:
Just as the industrialized countries are now at a comparative advan-
tage by virtue of their abundant capital and technological mastery, so
does an abundant labour supply confer a comparative advantage on
the developing countries. Technology and capital are cheaper in the
North than in the South: yet it is not considered unfair to develop ac-
tivities based on this comparative advantage. Nor, therefore, would it
make sense to reproach the South for having lower labour costs than
the North because therein lies its present advantage.
Id. at 428 (citing F. Blanchard, International trade and employment: The role of
the ILO, seminar on the North-South dialogue, Autumn 1980).
47. See Amato, supra note 17, at 84, for a complete discussion of the signifi-
cance of the worker rights provisions of OTCA.
1994] 167
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conditions required by OPIC, CBERA, and GSP are placed only
upon eligibility for special benefits; normal trade relations be-
tween the United States and the beneficiary country under
these programs are unaffected by the labor rights provisions. 48
The OTCA, however, conditions normal trade relations on re-
spect for worker rights.49
II. THE HARKIN BILL
The Child Labor Deterrence Act of 199350 emerges out of
this backdrop of conditioning trade upon worker rights. The
proposed act, also know as the "Harkin Bill" ("Bill"), is spon-
sored by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa). The Bill currently has
fourteen co-sponsors5 ' and is pending in the Senate Finance
Committee. If enacted, the Harkin Bill would significantly ex-
48. Nonetheless, the denial of such benefits may well be a violation of
GATIT's Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) obligations under Article 1:1. See GATT
art. 1:1. Under GATs MFN provision, any trade benefit that one GATT mem-
ber extends to another member must be unconditionally extended to all other
members. Id. The placing of worker rights conditions on GSP benefits does not
appear to be authorized by the Enabling Clause which allows the granting of
GSP privileges. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity, and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, BISD 26th Supp. at 203 (1980).
49. Under the amended version of Section 301, taking retaliatory measures
against a trading partner for failing to support worker rights is a completely
discretionary measure. See supra text accompanying note 44. Since the provi-
sion has yet to be used by the executive, it is not yet GATT inconsistent.
"[Liegislation merely giving those executive authorities the power to act incon-
sistently with the General Agreement is not, in itself, inconsistent with the
General Agreement." GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States - Re-
strictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/1 (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1594, 1619 (Nov. 1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin].
50. S. 613, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). A companion bill has been pro-
posed in the House by Representative George Brown Jr. (D-California). H.R.
1397, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House bill is significantly different from
the Senate bill in that it does not apply to articles produced by a foreign indus-
try unless such industry "does not comply with the applicable national laws
prohibiting child labor in the workplace.' H.R. 1397 § 4(aXl). See infra note
53. The bill was introduced on March 18, 1993 and referred to the House Ways
and Means Committee. In the Senate, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH)
introduced a bill, Child Labor Amendments of 1993 (S. 86), which would beef up
domestic child labor laws by setting criminal sanctions for willful violators of
child labor laws and limit the weekly hours minors could work. On the same
day, Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) introduced The Young American
Worker's Bill of Rights (H.R. 1106) which would establish criminal sanctions for
willful violations of child labor laws and, for the first time, limit the number of
hours that sixteen or seventeen year old youths can work while in school.
51. The co-sponsors are Senators Campbell (D-CO), Conrad (D-ND), Das-
chle (D-SD), DeConcini (D-AZ), Dorgan (D-ND), Feingold (D-WI), Grassly (R-
IA), Inouye (D-HI), Kennedy (D-MA), Levin (D-MI), Metzenbaum (D-OH),
Riegle (D-MI), Rockefeller (D-WV), and Wofford (D-PA).
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tend the linkage between international child labor and U.S.
trade policy. The Bill attempts to curtail the employment of
children in the production of goods for export by prohibiting the
entry of such goods into the United States and encouraging
other nations to join in a ban on trade in such products.5 2
The Harkin Bill would prohibit the importation of any man-
ufactured article that is the product of a foreign industry that
the Secretary of Labor has identified as using child labor.5 3
52. S. 613 § 2(b). Senator Harkin made the following remarks introducing
the Bill:
Mr. President, that's what this bill is about - children whose dreams
and childhood are being sold for a pittance - to factory owners and in
markets around the globe. It's about protecting children around the
globe and their future. It's about eliminating a major form of child
abuse in our world. It's about breaking the cycle of poverty by getting
these kids back out of factories and into schools. It's about raising the
standard of living in the Third World so we can compete on the quality
of goods instead of the misery and suffering of those who make them.
It's about assisting Third World governments to enforce their laws by
ending the role of the United States in providing a market for goods
made by children and encouraging other nations to do the same. Mr.
President, unless the economic exploitation of children is eliminated,
the potential and creative capacity of future generations will forever be
lost on the factory floor.
139 CONG. REC. 83179 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993). Connected with this concern
for the welfare of child workers is a notion that child labor provides an "unfair
advantage" to those foreign industries that use it. See supra note 46 and accom-
panying text. By exploiting children, manufacturers are able to keep prices ar-
tificially low, and thus undercut American (and other countries) firms. A
provision of the Child Labor Deterrence Act states, "Adult workers in the
United States and other developed countries should not have their jobs imper-
iled by imports produced by child labor in developing countries." S. 613, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(aX9) (1993). Although the Bill specifically mentions child
labor in developing countries, illegal child labor continues to be a problem in the
developed world. Child labor may be concentrated in developing countries, but
it is certainly not confined to them. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu
OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRns, supra note 6. The report noted that Greece, Italy, Po-
land, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey had child labor "problems." Id. at 20. The
United States also has lingering problems with the employment of children as
evidenced by recent legislation. See supra note 50.
53. S. 613 § 5(a)(1). It should be noted that the House version of the Bill
adds that the industry's use of child labor must also be in violation of "applica-
ble national laws." H.R. 1397 § 4(a)(1). This is in sharp contrast to the Senate
bill which applies regardless of the national laws of the exporting country. The
provision is a puzzling addition to the Bill since it would make the remainder of
the Bill, which defines child labor and fixes a minimum age of fifteen for em-
ployment, basically irrelevant. The House version of the Child Labor Deter-
rence Act could also have the somewhat perverse effect of punishing countries
that enact child labor legislation while leaving those with no such legislation
untouched. The provision appears to be an attempt to refrain from violating
the sovereignty of the exporting state, but it in effect takes the punch out of the
Senate version. The House version of the Bill is interesting, however, in that it
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Under the Act, a child is defined as "an individual who has not
attained the age of 15." 54 A manufactured article includes any
good that is fabricated, assembled, or processed, including any
mineral resources that are entered in a crude state.55 To be con-
sidered a product of child labor, the article must be "manufac-
tured" in whole or in part by one or more children under any one
of the following conditions: (1) in exchange for remuneration
(regardless of to whom paid), subsistence, goods or services; (2)
under circumstances tantamount to involuntary servitude; or (3)
under conditions posing serious health problems. 56 Signifi-
cantly, the Bill does not cover children working in agriculture or
children working for their own families.57
The Bill would require the Secretary of Labor to identify for-
eign countries that use child labor in the manufacture of prod-
ucts for export and have, on a continuing basis, exported such
products to the United States. 58 As part of the identification
process, the Secretary must undertake periodic reviews which
include information made available by the ILO and human
rights organizations. 59 The Bill also authorizes any person to
file a petition with the Secretary requesting that a particular
foreign industry be identified as using child labor in the export
of goods.60 The Secretary has ninety days to conduct an investi-
gation and determine whether or not any further action is war-
closely reflects the approach taken in the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment Side Accords on Labor. See infra note 146.
54. S. 613 § 8(2).
55. S. 613 § 8(7). "Any mineral resource that at entry has been subjected to
only washing, crushing, grinding, powdering, levigation, sifting, screening, or
concentration by flotation, magnetic separation, or other mechanical or physical
processes shall be treated as having been processed for the purposes of this
Act." Id.
56. S. 613 § 8(1).
57. Children who work for their families may be covered by the Bill if they
are paid or if they work under conditions posing serious health risks. While it
is possible to consider a child working for her family without pay as working for
remuneration (i.e., subsistence) such a classification seems unlikely. The exclu-
sion of family work and agriculture is extremely significant since the majority
of children working in many developing countries are working in either (or
both) of these two sectors. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. Also,
the definition of "family" itself may present some difficulties due to differing
cultural concepts of the term.
58. S. 613 § 4(a).
59. Id. Such organizations are not allowed to file under the GSP
provisions.
60. S. 613 § 4(bX1). This person need not be an interested party as defined
under the GSP. See supra note 32.
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ranted.6 1 The Secretary must explain the facts and reasons
underlying the decision, regardless of the decision made.62 Prior
to identification, the Secretary is also required to consult with
the USTR, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce,
and the Secretary of the Treasury and to consider written com-
ments from the public.63
Once a foreign industry has been identified as using child
labor, the Secretary of the Treasury (via the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice) may not permit the entry of any manufactured article that
is a product of that foreign industry.64 The Bill allows the Secre-
tary of Labor to revoke this prohibition if available information
indicates that such action is "appropriate."65 Nonetheless,
before removing an industry from the prohibited list, the Secre-
tary must publish notice that a revocation is being considered
and invite written comment from the public. 66 The Secretary
must also inform Congress of any revocation, stating the facts
and reasons why the Secretary considers revocation
appropriate.67
Finally, the Bill sets forth civil and criminal penalties for
importing articles in violation of the act. Civil penalties may be
up to $25,000.68 Criminal penalties for intentional violations
may include fines between $10,000 and $35,000 or imprison-
ment for one year, or both. 69
The Harkin Bill represents an important extension upon ex-
isting legislation linking trade and child labor. First, the Bill
furthers the principle established in the OTCA conditioning re-
ciprocal trade upon certain worker rights. Second, the Bill sepa-
rates child labor from general worker rights as an independent
source of trade restriction. Third, the Bill adds some greater
61. S. 613 § 4(bX)(2XA).
62. S. 613 § 4(b)(2XB).
63. S. 613 § 4(c).
64. S. 613 § 5(a)(1). While previous U.S. legislation involving goods pro-
duced by child labor overseas has focused on national level decisions, see supra
notes 27-32 and accompanying text, the Harkin Bill provides for individual in-
dustry distinctions. The Bill also provides that articles of an "identified" indus-
try may still be allowed to enter the United States if they were en route to the
United States before the first day of the effective identification period or if there
exists adequate certification that the article is not the product of child labor. S.
613 § 5(a)(2).
65. S. 613 § 4(d).
66. Id. § 4(d)(3).
67. Id. § 4(d)(2).
68. Id. § 6(b).
69. Id. § 6(c).
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precision to the definition of child labor.70 Fourth, the Bill pro-
hibits the importation of specific articles rather than the general
goods of a specific nation. Finally, the Bill forces the adminis-
tration to reach a prompt decision and to explain its action. By
"opening up" the decision, the Child Labor Deterrence Act may
increase the political pressure on the administration to take
action.71
III. THE HARKIN BILL AND AMERICAN OBLIGATIONS
UNDER GATT
The Harkin Bill constitutes a fairly dramatic step in U.S.
trade policy. If the Bill were enacted, the United States would,
for the first time, include the labor used to produce a good as a
factor in determining its policies regarding the importation of
that good. Thus, questions arise concerning the legality of such
a significant policy change under existing international eco-
nomic law.
The primary international agreement governing trade regu-
lations is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 72 As a general policy, GATT prohibits the use of em-
bargoes or quotas. GATT Article XI provides that "No prohibi-
tions or restrictions... whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of
any product of the territory of any other contracting party
.... "73 Since the Harkin Bill would place an embargo or a "zero
quota" on goods produced by child labor, there is a clear risk that
the Bill may prove contrary to GATT if enacted in its present
form. 7 4
70. Some general principles concerning the definition of "a minimum age
for the employment of children" have been established by the Department of
Labor. See LYLE, supra note 21, at 26-29. Nonetheless, unlike the definition of
child labor in the Harkin Bill, these principles are not binding legal definitions.
Id. at 20 n.13.
71. By forcing the administration to make a determination solely on the
issue of child labor, the Bill limits the leeway the various factors taken into
account in GSP determination allow. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying
text.
72. See supra note 11.
73. GATT art. XI.
74. The provisions of CBERA, GSP, OPIC, and MIGA which condition the
grant of preferential status for imports upon upholding certain worker rights
may themselves be in violation of GATT Article 1:1. See supra note 48. OTCA
may also prove to be a violation, but this completely depends on how the Presi-
dent uses its provisions. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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There are two arguments available to the United States to
defend the Harkin Bill against claims of a GATT violation.
First, Article XI applies only to restrictions imposed at the bor-
der. The United States could attempt to classify the prohibition
of goods produced by child labor as part of an "internal" market
regulation which forbids the manufacture or sale of products of
child labor regardless of their source. Internal regulations are
governed by GATT Article III rather than Article XI.75 Article
III permits internal regulations which treat foreign products "no
less favorably" than like domestic products. 76 Second, the
United States could claim that even if the regulation is a prohib-
ited border restriction, the measure is permitted under GATT
Article XX as one of the enumerated "general exceptions." 77
These characterizations of the Harkin Bill are similar to
those put forth by the United States in defending its restrictions
on the import of Mexican tuna. In United States - Restrictions
on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna/Dolphin"), a GATT panel limited the
extent of GATT Articles III and XX to the protection of purely
domestic interests. 78 The Panel determined that the United
75. GATT Ad art. III provides that,
[ainy internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in [Article 111:l] which applies to an
imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or
enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind re-
ferred to in [Article III:l], and is accordingly subject to the provisions
of Article III.
GATT art. III. Thus the fact that a regulation is enforced at the border does not
prevent it from being an "internal regulation" within the context of the GATT.
76. GATT art. III:4. Article III:4 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their inter-
nal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Id.
77. All GATT obligations are subject to Article XX general exceptions.
GATT art. XX. Article XX enumerates a series of broad clauses excepting cer-
tain governmental regulations aimed at protecting national welfare from the
normal restrictions which GATr places upon national autonomy. Thus, Article
XX is only invoked when a measure constitutes a violation of normal GATW
rules. If the Harkin Bill were permitted under Article III as an internal regula-
tion, no violation would have occurred and thus Article XX would not be in-
voked. See JACKSON, supra note 11, ch. 12.
78. Thna/Dolphin, supru note 49. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), Pub. L. No. 95-522, 86 Stat. 1027, 1030 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1371(aX2)(E) (Supp. II 1990)), prohibits the importation of tuna into
the United States if the exporting country uses harvesting technology that
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States could not use trade restrictions in an attempt to control
Mexican methods of tuna fishing which resulted in a significant
number of dolphin deaths. 79 The Tuna/Dolphin decision thus
serves as a good indicator of how the Harkin Bill would fare
under GATT jurisprudence.
In support of the GATT-legality of the Harkin Bill, the
United States could first argue that it is not constructing an im-
port policy, but rather enforcing a domestic rule on the sale of
goods. Under this approach, American regulations simply pro-
hibit articles produced by child labor from the U.S. market.
Both foreign and domestic industries would be treated the same.
Senator Harkin intimated such a characterization in his re-
marks introducing the Bill before the Senate. The Senator
stated, "[t]his legislation is not about imposing our standards on
the developing world. It's about preventing those manufactur-
ers in the developing world who exploit child labor from impos-
ing their standards on the United States."80 Senator Harkin
attempted to characterize the Bill as upholding an "internal reg-
ulation" of the United States itself. Internal regulations fall
under GATT Article III, which allows a government to adopt any
internal regulation it chooses, so long as the regulation provides
foreign goods no less favorable treatment than like domestic
products."' Since all goods produced by child labor are theoreti-
cally prohibited, the Bill treats foreign and domestic goods
equally.
causes an incidental taking of marine mammals or sea turtles in excess of U.S.
standards. Under the Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service (the Service)
of the Department of Commerce is responsible for administering this require-
ment. The Service determined that the dolphin deaths caused by Mexican tuna
fisherman in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean did not violate the require-
ments of the MMPA. The Earth Island Institute, a California non-profit organi-
zation, filed suit, and on April 11, 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the Service's interpretation conflicted with the statutory lan-
guage and congressional purpose of the MMPA. Earth Island Institute v. Mos-
bacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991). The court then ordered the
Secretary of Commerce to prohibit the import of Mexican tuna. Mexico made a
request for a panel under GATT Article XXIII to hear the dispute. The panel
concluded that the U.S. policy violated American obligations under the General
Agreement. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, International Decision: GATT Dis-
pute Settlement Panel, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (1992). See also Matthew H. Hur-
lock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend
the GAl"T in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2098
(1992).
79. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 49.
80. 139 CONG. REC. S3179 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993).
81. GAI Article III:4. See supra note 76.
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In light of the decision of the GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin,
this argument would not prevail. The GATT panel in that case
concluded that Article III extends only to those measures that
regulate some inherent quality of the product itself.8 2 In Tuna/
Dolphin, the tuna itself was the same regardless of whether its
harvesting resulted in the death of dolphins. The American leg-
islation did not concern the actual product which had entered
the United States, but rather a production process outside U.S.
jurisdiction.83 The harvesting methods had no impact whatso-
ever on the quality of the tuna and thus no direct impact on the
United States. Similarly, the Harkin Bill is not intended to af-
fect any inherent quality of the particular good, but rather the
manner in which that good is produced.
If the Harkin Bill does not qualify as an internal regulation,
it would be governed by GATT Article XI and would clearly con-
stitute a violation.84 Nonetheless, the United States could still
argue that the legislation falls under Article XX(b) and is thus
exempt from the provisions of Article XI. Article XX (General
Exceptions) is the source of most of the exceptions to the basic
free trade policy of the GATT. 85 Article XX(b) states, "nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . (b) neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."8 6 The
United States could argue that restrictions on the import of
goods produced by child labor are necessary to protect the health
of the children involved.8 7 For example, in carpet factories,
82. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 49, at 1618.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 77.
86. GATT art. XX(b). Article XX limits the extent of the exceptions by
making them "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade." Id.
87. See KNIGHT, supra note 1.
Studies available at the International Children's Center show that
many of the jobs done by children hurt their physical development, re-
sult in deformities, and a range of illnesses such as skin troubles, bron-
chitis, and tuberculosis. Growing bodies suffer from the effects of
fatigue and overexertion, and from poor hygienic conditions such as
excessive heat, bad weather, and prolonged contact with dust ...
Heavy loads and awkward body positions arrest the growth of bones in
children. Deformation of the spinal column, pelvis, or thorax can also
result from bending under heavy burdens or remaining in an unnatu-
ral position for a long time. There are also serious mental repercus-
sions .... Skipping all the problems, motivations, and interests of
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working children squat on planks for many hours each day; they
later suffer from bone deformities in their legs.8 8 Other children
working in these same factories perform highly detailed tasks
for long hours, resulting in permanent damage to their
eyesight.8 9
In Tuna/Dolphin, the United States argued that the re-
strictions on Mexican tuna were justified under Article XX(b).90
These restrictions were constructed so as to limit the killing of
dolphins during the harvesting of tuna. Accordingly, the restric-
tions were clearly intended to protect animal life. 91 Although
there is no express limitation in Article XX itself on the location
of the harm sought to be avoided, the GATT panel determined
that the history of Article XX(b) clearly indicated that the excep-
tion was intended to apply only where the primary target of the
protection lies within the jurisdiction of the importing country.92
Since the dolphins in question were not under U.S. jurisdiction,
the United States had no "right" to protect them. Similarly, just
as the dolphins which the United States sought to protect
through its legislation lie outside U.S. jurisdiction, the child la-
borers affected by the Harkin Bill work outside of the United
States.93
normal childhood has a permanent limiting effect on their later adult
lives.
Id. at 11-12.
88. See Hyndman, supra note 1, at 95.
89. Id.
90. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 49, at 1606. The U.S. also argued that the
MMPA was allowed under GATT Article XX(g) for measures "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effec-
tive in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
Id. at 1607.
91. Id. at 1598. Certain types of tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
often swim along with dolphins. Fisherman thus locate tuna by setting on the
dolphins which, being mammals, must come to the surface. Mexican fishing
boats in the region were using "purse-seine" nets to harvest tuna. This tech-
nique involves sending a motorboat out from the main vessel with one end of
the net to encircle a school of fish before connecting that end of the net back to
the main boat. The main vessel then draws in the net to gather its entire con-
tents. Fisherman thus knowingly trap dolphin in their nets when using this
technique. Id. See Kerry L. Holland, Note, Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use
of Purse Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fisherman in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 267 (1991).
92. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 49, at 1620. For a contrary view of the rele-
vant history, see Trachtman, supra note 78, at 143 n.2.
93. The jurisdictional infringements of the proposed child labor bill are sig-
nificantly more severe than those of the tuna case. In the tuna case, the dol-
phins in question were in the high seas and thus not in either American or
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The Tuna/Dolphin panel further noted that to meet Article
XX(b)'s requirement that the action be "necessary," the party in-
voking the exception must show that it had pursued all alterna-
tive options reasonably available to it which are consistent with
the General Agreement.94 The United States has not vigorously
approached child labor through either its control of domestic cor-
porations or its international aid policies. 95 The United States
would also have difficulty in establishing that it had exhausted
or even moderately pursued U.N. and I.L.O. channels or en-
gaged in bilateral negotiations to the fullest extent possible.96
The GATT panel's decision in Tna Dolphin follows the
principle that each country should have the right to determine
its own internal regulations. The result under Article III is that
Mexican jurisdiction. The child laborers covered by the Harkin Bill are clearly
under both the territorial and nationality jurisdiction of the exporting country.
94. Tuna IDolphin, supra note 49, at 1620. See also GATT Dispute Resolu-
tion Panel, Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, BISD 37th Supp. 200 (1990) (GATT panel report adopted on Nov. 7,
1990). The panel in this case determined that there were various measures
consistent with GATT which were reasonably available to Thailand to control
the quantity and quality of cigarettes smoked which could achieve the same
policy goals that the Thai Government pursues by restricting the importation of
cigarettes in violation of Article XI:I. Thus the import restrictions could not be
considered "necessary". Id. 81.
95. By exercising jurisdiction over its own nationals, the United States
could prevent American companies from using child labor overseas. See gener-
ally James M. Zimmerman, International Dimension of U.S. Fair Employment
Laws: Protection or Interference?, 131 INT'L LAB. REV. 217 (1992). Prior to 1957,
several courts gave the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), ch. 676, 52
Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988)), full extraterrito-
rial effect. The FLSA requires employers to follow minimum standards for
child labor as well as other pay and hours restrictions. In 1957, Congress
passed an amendment excluding from FLSA coverage "any employee whose
services during the work-week are performed in a workplace within a foreign
country." Id. at 221 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(f)). The United States could also
pursue activities attacking the root causes of child labor by supporting efforts
toward universal education and economic development in developing countries.
See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
96. As of January 1, 1990, the United States had ratified only six of the
ILO's 169 conventions. Of the six, four of the conventions dealt with workers at
sea, and only two were ratified since 1946. In contrast, the United Kingdom
had ratified 67 conventions, Japan 36 and India 30, to cite a few examples.
Bureau of Public Information, Chart of Ratification of International Labour
Conventions (1990). Interestingly, on September 25, 1991, the United States
ratified ILO Convention No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957).
Telephone interview with ILO Washington Office (Jan. 12, 1994). That conven-
tion corresponds to the third "international worker right" which is defined by
the GSP as "the right to avoid forced or compulsory labor." See supra note 22.
For a discussion of American efforts to include worker rights provisions within
the GATT see infra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
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the importing country may only regulate activities which have a
direct effect on its own citizens or territory. Under Article XX,
the enumerated exceptions are similarly restricted to the protec-
tion of purely domestic interests. If the panel adopted the posi-
tion supported by the United States, each GATT member could
unilaterally determine the policies from which other members
could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under
GAT[T. 9 7
Necessarily connected to this jurisdictional principle is a
process component. By limiting a nation's jurisdiction to the
protection of purely domestic interests, the panel in effect de-
clared the unilateral declaration of standards to be inappropri-
ate. The panel also implicitly indicated that multilateral
decisions among the members themselves is the appropriate
way of dealing with international concerns over the domestic
policies of another nation.98 The GATT requires multilateral de-
terminations of the conditions of trade; no one nation can arro-
gate to itself creation and supervision of global production. 99
The GATT panel's decision in Tuna/Dolphin makes it ap-
parent that the Harkin Bill would conflict with U.S. obligations
under GATT. Although GAIT panel decisions are not binding
precedent, 100 the principles laid out in the panel decision seem
97. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 49, at 1621.
98. Multilateralism refers to the idea that the trade agreement should be
equally formed by all the trading nations that it applies to. The GATT panel in
the tuna decision wrote,
These considerations led the Panel to the view that the adoption of
its report would affect neither the rights of individual contracting par-
ties to pursue their internal environmental policies and to co-operate
with one another in harmonizing such policies, nor the right of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES acting jointly to address international en-
vironmental problems which can only be resolved through measures in
conflict with the present rules of the General Agreement.
Id. at 1623.
99. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in A,-
GRESSIVE UNILATERALSM, supra note 10, at 1, 36.
The world trading regime should not be built on the assumption that
any one player, no matter how dominant, can impose its own rules,
unilaterally claiming social legitimacy for them. Institutions cannot be
built on notions of benign dictatorship: a lesson the functioning democ-
racy in the United States itself, with all of its slowness and "inefficien-
cies" that practitioners of real-politik complain of, amply teaches all of
US.
Id.
100. While, like other international law decisions, GATT panel reports do
not have strict "stare decisis" effect, prior precedents do have weight in various
international decisions and fora. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLUM J. DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 332 (2nd ed. 1986).
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an accurate interpretation of GATT, and it is unlikely that a fu-
ture panel would reach a significantly different result unless
GATT itself is amended in this regard.' 01
Although passage of the Harkin Bill would bring the United
States into violation of its GATT obligations, there is nothing in
domestic law which would prohibit the United States from en-
acting the Bill.10 2 It would not mark the first time that Con-
gress has passed a GATT-inconsistent measure.1 03 Proponents
with a strong moral objection to child labor may argue that the
critical conditions facing working children override the technical
requirements of GATT. As Representative Brown stated when
he introduced the House version of the Bill, "We cannot accept
the bizarre reasoning and skewed priorities whereby interna-
tional rules and U.S. import laws now protect endangered ani-
mals and plants, but remain silent on imports made by children
shamelessly exploited in the workplace."' 0 4 Thus, even if the
101. The panel's decision was not formally adopted by the CONTRACTING.
PARTIES. Under pressure from the United States, and given the on-going
NAFTA negotiations, Mexico chose not to pursue its claim. Thus, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES never actually voted on the ruling in the tuna case.
Trachtman, supra note 78, at 142 n.2. The lack of a formal ruling appears to be
largely a technicality. In the course of panel deliberations, Australia, Canada,
the EEC, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Senegal, Thailand,
and Venezuela submitted statements in support of the Mexican position.
Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 49, at 1610-16. The United States stood alone.
102. U.S. obligations under GATT were created by an executive agreement.
See supra note 11. Since federal laws have equal, if not superior, status to exec-
utive agreements, the later in time rule applies. An inconsistent federal law
enacted after the GATT provision takes precedence. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF Tim UNITED STATES § 115 (1987). Note that execu-
tive agreements, as federal law, prevail over inconsistent state law by reason of
the Supremacy Clause. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937).
A state trying to enact a bill like the Child Labor Deterrence Act would thus be
prohibited from doing so by the prior executive agreement.
103. The United States has a history, particularly in recent years, of non-
compliance with GATT rulings. See generally Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statisti-
cal Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1 (1993).
104. 139 CONG. REC. E 702, 703 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993). The Representa-
tive is referring to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora, Convention done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087,
T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973) [hereinafter CITES]. The
Convention entered into force for the United States on July 1, 1975. The Con-
vention prohibits trade in endangered species. A column in The Plain Dealer
commented, "When you consider the indignation that's been mobilized over
testing mascara on rabbits, turning minks into coats, polluting trout streams
and chopping down owl habitats, it'd be pretty depressing if we turned out not
to mind working little kids 15 hours a day for slave wages." Patricia McLaugh-
lin, Child-Labor Abuse Gains Notice, PLAIN DEALER, May 13, 1993, at 5D.
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GATT prohibits the United States from defending children, such
critics may contend that the United States has a moral obliga-
tion to take such measures.
Several factors may also enable the United States to "get
away" with the measure. First, developing countries may be
hesitant to challenge the measure. Countries that openly es-
pouse the use of child labor may risk consumer boycotts of their
goods. Countries may also be embarrassed to admit that they
depend upon child labor. Second, even if a GATT action is pur-
sued, the United States could simply block the action.10 5 Fi-
nally, even if developing countries could obtain a favorable
ruling, their ultimate sanctions may have little retaliatory effect
on an economy as large as that of the United States.
If the United States can disregard the decision of a GATT
panel, it should not be so quick to ignore the reasoning behind
GATT policy. The GATI panel in Tuna/Dolphin established
two principles: (1) decisions concerning production processes
which do not affect the good's impact on the importing country
should be left to the discretion of the producing nation; and (2)
any trade restrictions governing such decisions must be enacted
through multilateral agreements. Together, these two princi-
ples state that ultimate decisions concerning domestic regula-
tions are best left to the national governing authority. Such an
approach is more likely to lead to good policy decisions than the
unilateral American approach. Decisions are best reached by a
process which incorporates local information and local decision-
makers in the policy-making process. Good policy requires look-
ing at the specifics of the situation.l06
IV. THE HARKIN BILL AS CHILD LABOR POLICY
An analysis of the Harkin Bill illustrates the danger of uni-
lateral action. Such action may not only be ineffective, but may
actually harm those it is intended to help.10 7 If the American
concern truly lies in improving the situation of children in devel-
oping countries, the United States should seek negotiated multi-
105. Under the rules of GATT, a panel decision is not technically final until
it has been ratified by the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., members of GATT).
Since GATT traditionally resolves disputes on a consensus basis, any party, in-
cluding the party who received the adverse ruling, can block adoption of a panel
decision. See Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD 14th Supp. 139, X (1969).
Interestingly, member states have only seldomly refused to concede to an ad-
verse ruling. See generally Hudec, supra note 103.
106. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
180 [Vol. 3:161
CHILD LABOR
lateral actions against the exploitation of child labor whenever
possible.108s
The Harkin Bill makes three implicit assumptions. First,
the Bill cites "under fifteen" as a universal definition of a
child.10 9 Second, the Bill assumes that prohibiting children
from working in industries exporting to the U.S. market will
keep children out of the workforce. Third, the Bill presumes
that keeping children out of the labor force will increase their
well-being. The truth of these suppositions varies significantly
across countries and across industries; a systematic analysis of
all three assumptions is necessary before determining the actual
effects of the Bill on working children.
First, the Harkin Bill defines a child as any person under
the age of fifteen. 1 10 By adopting a rigid age-based definition of
a child, the Harkin Bill assumes that there is a universal stan-
dard governing the appropriate age for a child to begin work.
This single standard approach neither takes into account cross-
cultural differences in family structure nor does it look at a
child's role as a participating member of society in general. 1 11
The belief that children should not be looked at as a form of eco-
nomically productive labor is a fairly recent development in in-
dustrialized societies and is not shared in much of the
developing world.1 12 Moreover, different societies have different
thresholds for defining childhood.1 13 Thus, even if there was a
108. Unilateral action may be warranted under certain extreme circum-
stances. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
109. S. 613 § 8(2).
110. Id.
111. See Russell L. Barsh, The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child:
A Case of Eurocentricism in Standard-setting, 50 NoRD. J. IN'L L. 24 (1989). In
this article, the author points out the eurocentricism in the U.N. human rights
system in general.
112. See MYRON WEINER, THE CHILD AND THE STATE IN INDIA 109-10 (1991).
The notion that children should be removed from the labor force and placed into
schools is a very modern one. Only recently were children transformed from
valuable economic assets to economically useless but emotionally priceless ob-
jects. Id. at 110 (referring to PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A So.
CIAL HISTORY OF THE FAMILY LIFE (1962), and VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE
PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985)).
113. In some societies, age may not be a sufficient basis for defining
"childhood." The fulfillment of certain social rites and traditional obli-
gations may well be important requirements in defining "adult" and
"child" status. In still others, the integration of childhood into socio-
economic life may begin so early, and the transition from childhood to
adulthood may be so smooth and gradual, that it may be virtually im-
possible to identify clearly the different life phases. We must therefore
recognize that we are dealing with a concept which could mean differ-
ent things depending on the context.
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common understanding among nations that children should not
work, different societies may have cultural differences concern-
ing the ages that demarcate childhood.1 14 As of 1988, eighteen
countries had a minimum age of twelve for admission to the for-
mal workforce; 115 nine countries had a minimum age of thirteen;
and forty-six had a minimum age of fourteen. 116
To justify the "under fifteen" definition of a child, the Bill
quotes a section of ILO Convention No. 138 Concerning Mini-
mum Age for Admission to Employment which states: "The min-
imum age specified in pursuance of paragraph 1 of this article
shall not be less than the age of compulsory schooling and, in
any case, shall not be less than 15 years."117 This apparent at-
tempt to cite a universal standard is, however, a bit misleading.
The actual ILO Convention is not nearly as rigid as the Bill im-
plies. Convention No. 138 aims for a progressive rise in mini-
mum age for admission to employment rather than the strict
enforcement of a pre-determined age. The Convention itself is a
fairly flexible instrument. It provides that a country whose
economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed
may: (1) specify a minimum age of fourteen years;" s (2) limit
the sectoral scope of application; 119 and (3) reduce to twelve the
minimum age of entry into employment in light work.120 A 1988
ILO publication stated that, "IT]he Convention, although com-
prehensive, provides flexible standards and guidelines for which
countries at different stages of socio-economic development can
ALEC FYFE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA, CHILD LABOUR: A GUIDE
To PROJECT DESIGN 6 (1993).
114. Some cultures may have no definable concept of childhood at all. Id.
115. For a list of specific countries, see INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, 7 CONDITIONS
OF WoRK DIGEST 10 (1988).
116. Id.
117. S. 613 § 2(aX2) (citing ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum
Age for Admission to Employment, June 6, 1973, art. 2, 3, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297,
300) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 1381. ILO Convention No. 138 is a con-
solidation and revision of ten earlier ILO Conventions establishing a minimum
age for employment in different sectors of economic activity. Other ILO conven-
tions concerning child labor cover night work, medical examinations, and un-
healthy and dangerous work. See H.T. Dao, ILO Standards for the Protection of
Children, 58 NoRD J. INT'L L. 54 (1989).
118. ILO Convention No. 138, supra note 117, art. 2(4).
119. Id. art. 5(1), (3). A developing country may limit the scope of applica-
tion of the Convention, provided that a minimum number of sectors are covered.
Id. Certain sectors are also required including: mining and quarrying; manu-
facturing; construction; electricity, gas and water; sanitary services; transport,
storage and communication; and plantation and other agricultural undertak-
ings mainly producing for commercial purposes. Id.
120. Id. art. 7(4).
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aim and which they can progressively raise as living standards
improve." 121
Despite this flexible approach, as of 1992 only thirty-nine
nations had ratified the Convention, far short of an interna-
tional quorum. 122 The United States itself has not ratified the
Convention. 123 Although American labor regulations most
likely exceed the requirements of the Convention, the United
States has resisted subjecting itself to international conventions
in general. 124 The American belief seems to be that we know
what is best for our own people. There seems to be something
doubly wrong in refusing to accept international standards as
binding upon oneself while pressing standards established uni-
laterally upon others. 125
Second, the Harkin Bill presumes that by eliminating the
ability of children to work in the export market, it will effec-
tively shift their time toward some beneficial activity like educa-
tion or leisure. 126 The Bill fails to recognize that work for the
export market is not the only work available. If surrounding
conditions "force" a child to work, and he or she is unable to
work in the export industry, the child will most likely simply
work elsewhere. In addition to export industries, children also
work in the home, in agriculture, and in industries producing for
121. INT'L LABouR OFFICE, supra note 115, at 7. The Convention also re-
quires a higher age (eighteen) for admission to employment in areas "likely to
jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young persons." ILO Convention No.
138, supra note 117, art. 3(1).
122. For a list of countries, see FYFE, supra note 113, at 55.
123. While it may seem a bit strange for a nation to cite an international
agreement it has not ratified, such a position is not unusual. The Third U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.b2/122 (Oct. 7, 1982)
reprinted at 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), has yet to come into force, yet some of its
provisions are nonetheless cited as evidence of customary international law.
See Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: Fisheries, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 792 (1992). The
International Court of Justice has also referred to the UNCLOS III as repre-
senting "general international law" regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone.
See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 92) 94.
124. See supra note 96.
125. For further discussion on this point, see infra notes 158-60 and accom-
panying text.
126. The insights of the new household economics are helpful in this regard.
See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATiSE ON THE FAmY (1981). The model
applies microeconomic analysis to the household, emphasizing that families are
producers as well as consumers. The model tells us that families determine the
particular use of their members' time by weighing the various options available
to them. Roughly speaking, a child's time can be spent in three ways; work,
leisure, or investment (education or physical development).
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the domestic market; none of these areas are affected by the
Harkin Bill. 127 These jobs generally provide lower pay and may
often be more hazardous than comparable export-related jobs. 1 28
A BBC field report from Bangladesh provided a similar analysis:
Only those industries that export to the U.S. are affected by the Har-
kin Bill. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, that's just the garment
industry. But the estimated 50,000 children who've been working in
garment factories are part of a much greater total of over six million
child laborers nationwide.... Unfortunately, the bill doesn't concern
itself with those children working in dangerous environments such as
glass-blowing factories or as prostitutes, so former child garment work-
ers could be queuing up to join them. 129
Third, the Bill assumes that removing children from the
work force will improve their well-being. This assumption is
made without considering the alteratives available to the chil-
dren.' 30 Although work can certainly be prejudicial to a child's
127. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The majority of children
who work do so in agriculture. KNIGHT, supra note 1, at 13. Another commen-
tator notes:
Most experts agree that the majority of working children, and much of
the worst exploitation, is in rural areas, especially among agricultural
laborers. Yet, much more visible urban street workers, who may be
relatively better off and fewer in number, have been receiving consid-
erably more attention from both national and international agencies.
Likewise, ignoring children who work as household domestics - per-
haps the largest children's occupational group in some countries - dis-
criminates against girls, who predominate in this occupation.
PROTECTING WORKING CHILDREN 6 (William Myers ed., 1991).
128. A Department of Labor monograph commented:
Ironically, children would be better off if they were working in the for-
mal sector. But they are legally prohibited from doing so, and in the
formal sector the prohibition is in fact applied effectively. So children
are thrown back into the informal sector, where working conditions are
poor, and where, it goes without saying, there are no welfare facilities,
no work rules, low pay, and no future.
KNIGHT, supra note 1, at 9.
129. Child Labor Bill May Have Unintended Effects, National Public Radio,
July 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Current file. According to
figures published by the Swiss-funded Underprivileged Children's Education
Program, there are nearly 3 million children under the age of 14 working for a
living in urban areas of Bangladesh. Many of these children collect garbage.
Sabir Mustafa, Factories Lay Off Underage Workers, UPI, May 9, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
130. See CLARK NARDINELLi, CHILD LABOR AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
7 (1990). Nardinelli notes:
The economic approach is to consider alternatives. The economist
rarely deals in absolutes; thus the question is not whether something
is good or bad but whether it is better or worse than the alterna-
tives.... Clearly, under some conditions child labor improves the con-
ditions of children and under other conditions it does not.
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emotional, physical, and intellectual development, 131 the ab-
sence of work can also condemn a child to a variety of social,
moral, and health risks.132 This is particularly true in areas
where poverty is entrenched, where the child would be unable to
attend school due to a lack of adequate school facilities, or where
attending school is simply too expensive. 13 3 If a child can not
attend school and is prohibited from work, what avenue is open
to them for personal development? Income from work may also
be necessary to sustain a child's nutritional and health status.
Depending on the particular work conditions, work can also
benefit a child.134 Work can develop a child's social and techni-
cal skills and increase a child's confidence and self-esteem.
Work can also aid children in entering the adult world. By
working and contributing to the family income, children can im-
prove their own health and nutrition status as well as that of
their other family members.
As detailed above, the Harkin Bill is thus premised on three
highly questionable presumptions. A further flaw of the Bill is
that it attempts to tackle a complicated problem with a simple
regulatory approach. Child labor is an immense and complex
problem in which economic, legal, political, cultural, and other
factors are all intertwined. One of the major limitations of the
Bill is that it does nothing to change the factors which lead a
child to work in the first place. The ILO cites several conditions
which contribute to child labor: poverty, lack of access to school-
131. See supra note 87.
132. See INr'L LABouR OFFICE, supra note 115, at 14.
133. In many developing countries, children within compulsory school
age can not attend school because there is no school available. Even
where schooling facilities are within reach, the urge of poverty may be
more pressing than the immediate advantages of schooling, especially
when further education prospects are dim in the long term and any
ensuing benefits likely to be low.
Dao, supra note 117, at 64. The percentage of children who enroll in secondary
school (sixth or seventh grade) is very low in many developing nations. WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, 294-95 (1993). Examples of national
enrollment rates in secondary school include: Bangladesh, 17%; Brazil, 39%;
India, 44%; Indonesia, 45%; Nepal, 30%; Nigeria, 20%; Pakistan, 22%; and
Thailand, 32%. Id.
134. See Philip Alston, Implementing Children's Rights: The Case of Child
Labour, 58 NORD. J. IN'iL L. 35 (1989).
Since not all of the world's working children are exploited, and since
certain forms of work may be highly beneficial to the children con-
cerned, it is necessary not only to ascertain the incidence of child la-
bour in the world but also to draw the line between exploitative and
non-exploitative practices. (footnotes omitted)
Id. at 36. See also FYrz, supra note 113.
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ing, migration to urban areas, rapid population growth, and in-
sufficient employment opportunities for adults.'35 Neither the
Child Labor Deterrence Act nor any accompanying congres-
sional policy address any of these other interrelated issues. 136
The point here is not that child labor is a good thing. In an
ideal situation, all children would have the ability to go to school
and to play. But the Child Labor Deterrence Act is not about
creating that ability. It is about limiting choices, and it fails to
take account of the factors affecting those choices. This is pre-
cisely the concern behind the GATT policy prohibiting nations
from imposing their standards upon other countries. Ascertain-
ing the precise nature of the problem in a given area is a prereq-
uisite to effective action.' 37 A national government making its
own policy is in a better position to consider and balance its own
needs and the needs of its citizens than a foreign government
enforcing its own views unilaterally.13  Good policy requires
looking at the specifics of the situation.
Due to the vast sociological, economic, and cultural differ-
ences that exist among countries, standards governing the mini-
mum age of employment will not be universal. Modern
standards in the North were created in response to the needs of
that society. Such standards may be well adapted to meet those
135. See INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 115, at 3-4. According to the new
household economics, how a child's time is allocated depends on income, rela-
tive shadow prices, and the preference of parents. See NARDINELIA, supra note
130, at 40. See also BECKER, supra note 126.
136. As the ILO Director-General has noted:
Thus the elimination of child labour and the progressive raising of the
minimum age for admission to employment must be regarded as objec-
tives to be attained gradually and as an integral part of a process of
development designed to overcome the scourges of unemployment and
destitution. Formal measures alone will not work; if applied in isola-
tion from over-all measures to improve the economic and social con-
text, and especially in the absence of alternatives to work, they may
even be harmful.
Alston, supra note 134, at 39 (citing ILO Director-General's Report 38 (1983)).
137. One commentator has noted,
High-minded, abstract platitudes so common to this area of concern
are of little help in penetrating thorny moral, technical, political, eco-
nomic and cultural thickets to effectively reach real children. Effective
protection of working children requires that compassionate vision and
firm resolve be matched to a realistic appreciation of the situations,
opportunities and constraints within which practical action can be
taken.
PROTECTING WORKING CHMDREN, supra note 127, at x. See also Alston, supra
note 134, at 38-40.
138. See generally Hurlock, supra note 78.
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needs, yet still be ill-adapted to the conditions existing in many
other nations. 139
Nonetheless, child labor policies should not be completely
left to each country's unfettered discretion. The world does have
an interest in human rights and in some minimum protection
for children. 140 There are certain absolutes arising from the in-
herent dignity of human beings which all nations should adhere
to regardless of their level of development. Some of the condi-
tions under which children labor in the world today should not
be tolerated in any country. 141 There is no social, economic, or
cultural justification for children to work as bonded labor in
near slave-like conditions, or for six or seven year olds to be
139. This goes to the heart of the assertion that the use of child labor consti-
tutes an unfair trade practice which gives foreign firms an unjustified competi-
tive advantage. The idea that child labor is an unfair trade practice is
contingent on the fact that employers are actually exploiting their child work-
ers. As the previous discussion illustrates, different economic conditions may
exist which make different standards among countries equally valid. A viable
restriction on child labor can not be determined in isolation from other social
and economic issues.
140. Since the creation of the United Nations in 1948, several UN covenants
have been enacted which prohibit the exploitation of child workers as part of a
general human rights standard. The two most widely accepted have been the
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 (Article 1), April 30, 1957,
18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, which has been ratified by
102 nations, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, at
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), which has been ratified by ninety-two countries.
Other significant instruments include the Declaration on the Rights of the
Child of 1959, G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 19, U.N.
Doc. A/4354 (1959), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 25
(XLIV), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st Plen. mtg., annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25
(1989), which opened for signature on Jan. 26, 1990.
141. In 1978, The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities appointed Mr. Abdelwahad Bouhdiba as Spe-
cial Rapporteur to study the question of child labor. He offered the following
conclusions:
In at least three cases the exploitation of child labour is no less than a
flagrant crime which violates the United Nations Charter, the princi-
ples of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the most elementary principles of morality and all positive laws.
Energetic repressive action is called for in these cases, namely: (a) Sale
and similar practices (serfdom, bond-service, fake adoption, abandon-
ment); (b) Child prostitution, trafficking in pornography involving the
sexuality of children, and the international traffic in girls and boys for
immoral purposes; (c) Under-age maid servants in a position of
servitude.
Yo Kubota, The Protection of Children's Rights and the United Nations, 58
NoRD. J. INiL L. 16 (1989).
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working under hazardous factory conditions for ten to twelve
hours a day for virtually no pay.142
The inability of a national government to prevent wide-
spread child labor under such exploitative conditions may be a
result of "political failure" within that country.14 3 Employers
are powerful, child laborers are not. Protecting the rights of
child laborers may not be given a high priority. There may be an
inadequate allocation of resources to enforce existing protective
laws. Finally, class distinctions may result in a ruling elite
which is largely indifferent to the conditions of poor or minority
children.1" Given the existence of these failures, there is a need
for international protection of working children.
V. OPTIONS FOR INTERVENTION ON
BEHALF OF CHILDREN
The GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin established the principle
that countries can only regulate the internal conditions of pro-
duction of another country through international agreements. 145
Accordingly, if the United States wants to enact protective
measures for child laborers, it must do so through multilateral
(or at least bilateral) negotiations. 14 6 In light of the benefits of
142. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRS, supra note
6.
In Uttar Pradesh, India, child labor recruiters entice parents to pledge
their children against earning "advances." Recruited children must
work as unpaid "trainees" for 6 months to 1 year, after which they may
earn four to eight cents a day. There are no holidays. For most chil-
dren, this lasts 5 to 6 years, the period for which they were bonded.
Id. at 3. See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAU OF INT'L LABOR AFFAIRs, PAKI-
sTAN, 91-06 FOREIGN LABOR TRENDs (1991).
Bonded labor is widespread in Pakistan, as throughout the subconti-
nent, in brick-making, carpet weaving, fish cleaning and packing,
shoe-making, auto-repair, agriculture, mining, and quarrying indus-
tries. Bonded laborers and their families are trapped by pay advances
(peshgi) which they are unable to work off. An employer can keep an
illiterate indentured worker in financial bondage almost indefinitely,
with the debt often being passed down to his children.
Id. at 9.
143. See Hyndman, supra note 1, at 102-03.
144. See WEINER, supra note 112. In this book, Weiner raises the argument
that traditional notions of social rank and hierarchy may result in beliefs that
certain people are appropriate for working, not thinking. Id. In order to per-
petuate such a system, the state must keep children in manual labor jobs and
out of schools.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
146. See supra notes 98-99. The side agreement on labor of the recently
approved North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an example of a
negotiated "labor rights" agreement. See North American Free Trade Agree-
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local input, a negotiated agreement has significant advan-
tages. 147 Negotiated agreements ensure that a variety of per-
spectives are heard and that information from local sources is
used in constructing policy. Unilateral measures are often un-
dertaken with little consideration given to the particular cir-
cumstances of the countries affected. Thus, although
multilateral agreements may not be as quick or as easy to en-
force as unilateral agreements, they constitute a more appropri-
ate and effective means of improving the situations of child
workers.
Nonetheless, despite the sound policy reasons behind
GATT's prohibition of unilateral action, there are times when
moral imperatives may make such action justifiable or perhaps
even require it.148 Negotiations can continuously drag on while
actions without any shadow of legitimacy continue to take
place. 149 There is no serious ideology which professes that work-
ing under exploitative circumstances is good either for the child
ment Side Accords on Labor Cooperation, Import Surges, BNA DAILY REPORTS
FOR ExEcuTmvs, at M177 (1993). The Agreement does not establish common
minimum standards but rather explicitly recognizes the right of each party to
establish its own labor standards. Id. art. 2. The Agreement allows a party to
protest if another party has persistently failed to enforce its own occupational
safety and health, child labor, or minimum wage technical labor standards. Id.
art. 27. An Arbitral Panel may be established to hear the dispute if prior con-
sultations prove ineffective. Id. art. 29. The goal of such an approach would
seem to be to provide some transparency to the current status of worker rights
in each country. The Agreement also establishes a Ministerial Council, id. art
8, which serves several functions, including promoting cooperative activities be-
tween the parties regarding child labor. Id. art. 11(b).
147. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. See also Hurlock,
supra note 78, at 2142-44.
148. See generally Hudec, supra note 41. Professor Hudec develops the con-
cept of "justified disobedience." Id. A nation practices justified disobedience
when the damage to the legal system caused by inaction in the face of deadlock
will exceed the damage caused by some disobedient act trying to force a correc-
tion. Id.
149. GATT itself provides an excellent example of this problem.
While it is possible to remedy inadequacies by negotiation, the reform
process is often maddeningly slow, and sometimes stalls completely,
due to the need for agreement of the nearly one hundred national gov-
ernments who are GATT's law-making body. Governments tend to
support law reform in principle, but when confronted with specific
legal reforms that will call upon them to change domestic laws and
practices, they encounter strong political pressures to follow the safer
course of keeping the status quo. This political caution is not peculiar
to GATr; indeed, GATT has probably been more successful in overcom-
ing it than many other international organizations that deal in politi-
cally sensitive matters. But it is still strong enough in GAir that law
reform is seriously hobbled by it.
Id. at 126.
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or the society in which he or she lives. 150 The severe exploita-
tion of child workers is so unacceptable that it should not be left
aside indefinitely when there is little hope that either domestic
conditions will improve, or that a multilateral agreement can be
reached.
In such extraordinary situations, unilateral action may be
warranted even though such action is in clear contradiction to
GATT.151 As the Harkin Bill so clearly demonstrates, unilateral
action is a dangerous area ripe for abuse. In order to protect
against such abuse, five conditions should be fulfilled before a
country resorts to such unilateral measures.' 5 2 First, good faith
attempts at negotiations must have failed. Second, the enacting
nation should take all reasonable GATT-consistent measures
before resorting to unilateral trade restrictions. Third, the
measures enacted should not be self-serving. Fourth, the re-
striction should not enforce standards which are not widely ac-
cepted by other nations. And finally, the ultimate goal should
remain a multilateral agreement. The Harkin Bill is analyzed
below under these five steps.
First, good faith attempts at negotiations should have
failed. The United States has been a consistent proponent of at-
tempts to attach worker rights amendments to GATT. 153 In
150. See Alston, supra note 134, at 35.
151. The GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin established a rule against unilateral
actions. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99. While the author agrees
with the general rule, as with most rules, absolute adherence will result in un-
just outcomes on occasion. See Hudec, supra note 41.
152. The steps recommended in this Note are a variation of the guidelines
suggested by Robert E. Hudec. Id. at 137. Professor Hudec cites five substan-
tive guidelines that should be followed when taking GATT-inconsistent meas-
ures under Section 301:
1) The objective of the disobedient act must be to secure recognition of
a legal change that is consistent with the general objectives of the
GATT.
2) Disobedience undertaken in support of a claim must be preceded by
a good faith effort to achieve the desired legal change by negotiation.
3) Disobedience must be accompanied by an offer to continue to negoti-
ate in good faith, with a pledge to terminate the disobedient action
upon satisfactory completion of such negotiations.
4) The extent of the disobedience must be limited to that which is nec-
essary to achieve a negotiated legal reform of the kind needed to solve
the problem.
5) Governments must accept the power of the legal process to judge
their disobedient behavior, and must accept the consequences imposed
by law.
Id. at 137-38. See also Raymond F. Mikesell, GATT Trade Rules and the Envi-
ronment, 11 CoN Ep. POL'Y IssuEs 14 (1993).
153. The earliest American proposal for a labor rights provision in GATT
was made in 1953. Charnovitz, supra note 46, at 574. In 1987, the House of
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1986, the United States proposed including worker rights in the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.15 4 The initiative failed,
however, and the subject of worker rights was not included in
the Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay
Round.1 55 The United States more recently suggested that a
GATT Working Party be established to examine worker rights
issues.' 56  The proposal was also met with substantial
opposition. 157
Yet despite its leading role on worker rights in GATT, the
United States has resisted active participation in human rights
fora such as the ILO. Supporters of a worker rights provision in
GATT itself cite GATT's greater enforcement capacity and its
preferable political climate. 158 Nonetheless, there are other in-
ternational agreements unconnected with GATT which use
trade measures as enforcement provisions. 159 GATT is in many
ways a suspect forum for "humanitarian" claims. GATT is pre-
mised upon the economic self-interest of its members. It is a
trade forum. The preference for GATT over other fora implies
that the United States views international worker rights as pri-
marily a domestic economic concern rather than a moral or hu-
manitarian issue. 160
Second, a country should not take GATT-illegal action un-
less it has already taken alternative measures. 161 If the Child
Representatives passed a provision listing American objectives for the Uruguay
round. One of the objectives was, "to adopt, as a principle of GATT, that the
denial of worker rights should not be a means for a country or its industries to
gain competitive advantage in international trade." Id. at 575 (citing H.R. 3,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111(b)(10) (May 8, 1987)).
154. Id. at 565.
155. Id.
156. See Amato, supra note 17, at 92-94.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 92.
159. For example, CITES, supra note 104, seeks to protect endangered spe-
cies by strictly limiting trade in specimens of these species. The Basel Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989), prohibits trade in hazardous wastes unless
adequate disposal is ensured.
160. Such a characterization is supported by other U.S. legislation in the
area. Section 301 lists the denial of worker rights as an "unfair trade practice."
See supra text accompanying note 44. The Harkin Bill itself states as one of its
purposes, "Adult workers in the United States... should not have their jobs
imperiled by imports produced by child labor .... S. 613 § 2(a)(9). See also
infra note 164.
161. The GATT panel advocated this position in Tuna/Dolphin. See supra
note 94 and accompanying text. See also GATT Dispute Resolution Panel,
Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
supra note 94.
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Labor Deterrence Act truly signals that Americans are ready to
take some responsibility for the conditions of children in the de-
veloping world, then the country should demonstrate this com-
mitment by taking affirmative steps in that direction. There are
numerous non-trade related policies which the United States
could adopt which would both decrease the incidence of child la-
bor overseas and improve the conditions of the children them-
selves. Possibilities include increasing foreign aid to build and
equip schools and training facilities or helping develop employ-
ment opportunities for adults in developing countries in order to
alleviate the poverty underlying much of the need for child la-
bor. 162 The United States should earn its right to claim the
moral imperative.
Third, the measures enacted should not be clearly self-serv-
ing. It is interesting to note that the Harkin Bill professes to
help working children in a manner which costs the United
States nothing. In fact, the Bill appears partially aimed at im-
proving the U.S. economic situation. The direct effect of the Bill
would be to deny employment to children working overseas in
export industries and thus presumably boost domestic employ-
ment in those industries.163 Not surprisingly, the Bill has been
criticized as protectionist. 164
Fourth, such restrictions should not enforce standards
which are not widely shared by other nations - including na-
tions in similar circumstances to the target nation or nations.
162. A consumer boycott could also eliminate the purchase of goods pro-
duced by child labor. The recent German boycott of Indian carpets as a result of
consumer disdain for that industry's use of child labor has decreased sales to
the extent that the industry is currently negotiating a labelling agreement
which certifies that the carpet was not produced by child labor. See John Ret-
tie, UN Joins Assault on Child Sweatshops, GuARDLxN, May 7, 1993, at 12; The
Bonded Labour Issue, CAmr & FLoOncovEPaNGs REv., Feb. 5, 1993, at 21.
Since such boycotts are simply a reflection of "consumer tastes" and not a spe-
cific governmental policy, they are thus not a violation of GATTr. Nonetheless,
such boycotts contain similar policy risks as unilateral governmental prohibi-
tions; the boycott may not be based on a true understanding of the local situa-
tion. See supra notes 137-39.
163. See supra note 46. The lay-off of child workers overseas will not neces-
sarily lead to a boost in domestic employment. An official of the Bangladesh
Garment Exporters Association stated, "It won't cost us any extra money to
employ older staff as we always pay according to the job performed rather than
according to age." Sabir Mustafa, UPI (B.C. Cycle), Jan. 17, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, Current File.
164. Human Rights activists in Dhaka, Bangladesh, criticized the legisla-
tion saying it was designed to protect U.S. jobs and not to help the working
children of Bangladesh. Activists Blast U.S. Bill on Child Labor, UPI (B.C. Cy-
cle), Aug. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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Setting an age of fifteen as the minimum age of employment rep-
resents a northern, industrialized view of childhood. 165 The
United States should turn to international agreements, resolu-
tions, or to customary international law to locate applicable
standards. Unilateral actions which violate GATT should be
based upon clearly defined and broadly accepted norms. For ex-
ample, customary international law prohibits slavery in all its
forms.16 6
Finally, the ultimate goal of any unilateral action should re-
main a multilateral agreement. Thus, any nation undertaking
unilateral measures should continue to seek an international
agreement. The policy justifications of a multilateral agreement
remain strong. Negotiated agreements ensure that a variety of
perspectives are heard and that the competing needs of the peo-
ple are effectively balanced. The creation of such an interna-
tional agreement would do much more to help the world's
working children than passage of the Harkin Bill.
VI. CONCLUSION
Exploitative child labor remains a large problem in many
parts of the world. By prohibiting the import of manufactured
goods produced by children under the age of fifteen, the Child
Labor Deterrence Act attempts to tackle the problem of interna-
tional child labor. According to the principles established by the
GATT panel in TunalDolphin, GATT prohibits a nation from
enacting regulations which do not protect its own territory or
citizens, but instead seek to regulate economic activities within
another nation. Since the Harkin Bill attempts to unilaterally
establish a universal minimum age for admission to employ-
ment, the Bill would bring the United States into violation of
GATT.
By prohibiting the unilateral control of one nation over
other states' production processes, GATT supports not only no-
tions of national sovereignty, but the realization that local input
is necessary for effective regulation. Child labor is an immense
and complex problem in which socio-economic, legal, political,
cultural, and other factors are all intertwined. The unilateral
actions of a single nation are unlikely to be successful in attack-
165. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
166. One of the U.N. organs that works extensively with the rights of child
workers is the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. The com-
mittee examines questions surrounding such practices as the sale of children,
child prostitution, and detained children. See Kubota, supra note 141, at 10.
1994] 193
194 MNN J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 3:161
ing the problem. The United States should instead seek inter-
national agreements protecting working children from the most
severe instances of exploitation. Such agreements would best be
pursued outside the GATT, through the ILO, other U.N. organs,
or an international convention.
